

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY Korea

REPORT NO. 25X1

SUBJECT North Korean Intelligence Schools

DATE DISTR. 15 June 1953

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REFERENCES

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
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KIM Il-song Intelligence School

1. In December 1952 Lieutenant Colonel IM Kwang-chun (0117/0342/0193), aged 27 and a native of North Hamgyong Province, was director of the KIM Il-song Intelligence School. The school was organized with the following bureaus:
 - a. A training bureau that taught ROK army basic training and daily routines, and the difference in behavior between North Korean and South Korean troops. It also briefed students on how to pass inspection at ROK check points.
 - b. A firearms bureau taught the use of small arms, mines, hand grenades and techniques of sabotage. On 23 October 1952 a Soviet officer gave a 2 hour lecture on United States light machine guns and other weapons.
 - c. An operations bureau taught semiphore, camouflage techniques, intelligence procedures and differences in terminology between North and South Korean troops.
 - d. A political bureau taught North Korean history, world history, Marxism-Leninism, and South Korean social conditions.
 - e. A cultural bureau prepared cartoons, propaganda leaflets, dramas, broadcasts and speeches.

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2. On 23 December 1952 the North Korean army supreme headquarters issued the following directives to students before they left the school:
 - a. Obtain Order of Battle information on United Nations forces.
 - b. Obtain information regarding any proposed United Nations offensive.
 - c. Communicate with an agent who was interned in the Koje Island Prisoner of War Camp.
 - d. Resort to murder and arson if necessary to raise operational funds.

Kumkang Political Institute

3. In December 1952 the Kumkang Political Institute was at BT-504704 near Sango-dong (N 38-33, E 126-06) (BT-5070).¹ There were nine instructors at the school and 39 students enrolled in the 6-month course.² Students were taught party history and organization, military and guerrilla tactics and post-war Korea. Upon graduation, the students were to be infiltrated into South Korea to direct guerrilla activities and strengthen the party organization. Director of the Institute was KIM Ung-pin, aged 45,³ who was chief commissioner of the Seoul City Labor Party before the Korean war. The vice-director was YI In-dong, aged 45. KANG Ch'ol, aged 37, was the representative of the Institute's junior group and the liaison representative was PAE Ch'ol, aged 50.
4. The Kumkang school at Odong-ni (N 38-32, E 126-10) (BT-5368) was bombed on 25 October 1952 and its soy bean curd mill was destroyed. Since then, no agents trained at the school have been sent to South Korea. Agents infiltrated into South Korea from that time have been mainly from the 10th Detachment, 526 Army Unit.

Second T'aepaek Political School

5. In August 1952 the Second T'aepaek Political School was established 2 kilometers northeast of Kumch'on-dong, Sohung-gun, Hwanghae-do. The school was under the North Korean Ministry of Defense. Its missions were to strengthen and enlarge guerrilla operations in South Korea and to obtain Order of Battle information on United Nations and ROK forces. The training period was 2 months. Students spent 26 days on the following subjects: political science, political affairs, political geography, history of the Communist Party, military science and intelligence techniques.
6. The director of the school was a North Korean army major general and the assistant director and the chief instructor were senior colonels. Ten majors were assigned as instructors. The main staff was assigned by the Ministry of Social Security. The 450 students enrolled were divided into six district parties. District chiefs were responsible for the following districts: the first or Kyonggi Province - Seoul District, the second or Taepaek-san district, the third or Odae-san District, the fourth or Sobaek-san district, the fifth or Chiri-san district and the sixth or Hanla-san district. The districts covered the following operational areas: Area 1, everything within a 4 kilometer radius of Sangak-san with Seoul as the center; Area 2, Cho-do, north of the 38 Parallel and Kyonggi Province; Area 3, Paengnyon Island and south of the 38 Parallel; Area 4, all cities in Kyonggi Province except Seoul; Area 5, miscellaneous mountainous areas and Area 6, any other areas. Assigned to the areas were two combat patrols, two intelligence gathering groups, two guerrilla operations groups and four agent groups.

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COUNTRY	Korea	REPORT NO.	<input type="text"/>	25X1
SUBJECT	1. Organization of the North Korean 589 Army Unit 2. Infiltration Routes of North Korean Agents	DATE DISTR.	15 June 1953	
DATE OF INFO.	<input type="text"/>	NO. OF PAGES	2	
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1. The North Korean 589 Army Unit collects intelligence by infiltrating agents through trade routes. Colonel PAK Kwan-ch'ol (2613/1401/0811) commands the unit and has headquarters at Kaesong. The deputy commander, Lieutenant Colonel KIL Sa-in (0679/ ? / ?), is stationed at the unit's liaison headquarters at the foot of Namsan in Yonan-up (N 37-54, E 126-10).
2. The unit has the following sections: a staff for military operations, a rear service staff, a section known as the 313 Unit that carries out reconnaissance against South Korean military bases and a special section that handles operations through Kaesong business routes.
 - a. Major KANG Tok-hwa (1203/1795/0553) heads the military staff. Included in this staff are route chiefs for the Haesong, Haenam-ni (N 37-46, E 126-09) Kumsong-ni (N 37-54, E 126-14), Honghyon (N 37-58, E 126-16) and Panmunjom Districts and for important fishing villages and other important points. Route chiefs are responsible for infiltrating agents into South Korea.
 - b. A Senior Captain U (fnu) heads the rear service staff.
 - c. The 313 Unit is headed by Major MAENG Ch'ol (1322/6993). It has four sub-stations, a liaison office, a guard squad, supply chief and staffs for communications, reconnaissance and rank and file (sic).
 - d. Major CH'OE Sang-in (1508/4382/7792) heads the special section for operating through Kaesong trade channels. The section operates through the following companies:

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- (1) Sinsin Company (2450/2450/0361/4357).
- (2) Eastern Commercial Company (2639/2455) headed by U P'il-wŏn (4416/1732/3293).
- (3) Chohung Company (2600/5281/0361/4357), headed by CHONG (fnu).
- (4) Korean Central Commercial Company (2600/7639/0022/1135), headed by CHO Yong-hwan (6392/3057/3562).

3. Infiltration routes for enemy agents leading toward Seoul have been closed.¹ The route regarded as safest and most important is the Kimp'o-ri (N 37-45, E 126-37) (BS-9080) route which goes through Inch'on and Yondungp'o (N 37-31, E 126-55) (CS-1654). This is the route used mainly by the West Liaison Station.² When the first, second and third routes of the Central Liaison Station or the first route of the West Liaison Station are used, agents go to South Ch'ung-ch'ong Province by way of Myongji-san (N 37-56, E 127-26) (CS-6299) and Yoju (N 37-18, E 127-38) (CS-7929) or to the southern part of Kangwon Province or North Kyongsang Province by way of the mountains east of Kap'yong, by-passing Seoul.
4. Sea infiltration routes have become popular because of the vulnerability of the land routes. Agents leave Yŏnan (N 37-54, E 126-10) and land at Tonggang-ni (N 37-53, E 126-40) (BR-9595). From there they go by way of Sŏsan (N 36-47, E 126-27) (BR-7273), Hongsong (N 36-36, E 126-41) (BR-9152) and Yesan (N 36-41, E 126-51) (CR-0761) to South Kyongsang, North Kyongsang, South Cholla and North Cholla Provinces. 25X1

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	Korea	REPORT NO.	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px;"></div> 25X1
SUBJECT	North Korean 526 Guerrilla Unit	DATE DISTR.	15 June 1953
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February 1953

1. The North Korean army 776 Unit, organized by the Central Labor Party to conduct guerrilla activities in South Korea, has its headquarters at Namhyongjesan-myon (N 39-06 E 125-39) (YD-2931). The headquarters of the 10 Branch of the 776 Unit is in Ilsin-myon (N 37-55 E 125-51) (YC-5100).

18 January 1953

2. The 2 Battalion of the 10 Detachment of the North Korean 526 Unit is stationed near Naedong-ni (N 27-56, E 125-36) (YC-2801) and Mujong-ni (N 27-56, E 125-50) (YC-4902). The mission of this station is to guide its agents to South Korea.

December 1952, except as stated

3. In February 1952 the 10 Detachment, also known as the 776 Unit, of the North Korean 526 Unit¹ was activated with 3,000 men in two battalions and three independent companies at Ilsin-myon, Ch'ongyong-myon and Naesong-myon. On 20 October 1952 the detachment command post was moved to 30 private houses at BT-3924; the staff office to three private houses and a dugout at YC-5400; and the independent companies to private houses and dugouts around BT-3953. Fifty dugouts were excavated in the area between 15 October and 20 December 1952.

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4. The detachment was in charge of coastal defense in the vicinity of Yonbaek County until October 1952. It was also engaged in farming. Members of the detachment built barracks to house 3,000 former ROK prisoners-of-war who were assigned by the middle of December 1952. In September 1952 members of the detachment were given a national examination in which they were asked to discuss:

- a. Internal and international problems.
- b. Urgent problems to be carried out by the 10 Detachment.
- c. Why are we engaged in farming?
- d. Problems pertaining to the Labor Party.
- e. What should the North Korean People's Army do to win the war?

December 1952

5. The major mission of the detachment, which was composed of South Koreans, was the training of guerrillas who will fight in South Korea under direction of the Guerrilla Command Office and the Central Headquarters of the Labor Party. The strength of the detachment was 6,000 soldiers including staff members and 600 women. Ages of the members ranged from 13 to 46 but most of them were between 21 to 25. Eighty-five percent of the personnel were members of the Labor Party and 30 percent were Communist agents in South Korea before 1950. Independent companies were made up of laborers and were called "revolutionary companies." From 20 to 30 new members entered the unit each day from the army, party organizations and the Kumkang Political Institute by way of the Guerrilla Command Office. From 200 to 300 members of the detachment were in turn transferred to the Kumkang Political Institute and a subordinate training center of the Guerrilla Command Office and were then infiltrated into South Korea through the Eastern, Central, or Western Liaison Stations or the Institute.
6. The commander of the 10 Detachment was MAENG Chong-ho, also known as HO Chong-il. MAENG, aged 45, is a former member of the South Korean Labor Party who fled to North Korea in 1948. Subordinate to MAENG were the following:
- a. A chief of staff, YUN Kil, who controlled the following sections: a training section headed by YI Paek-nam; a technical staff headed by KIM Pyong-sang; a patrol staff headed by PAE Chin-tu; a personnel affairs staff headed by YU Sung-yol; an operations staff headed by KIM Ho-ch'ol; a telecode staff and a reconnaissance team of 12 men.
 - b. An assistant commanding officer for political affairs who controlled the propagandist; the party chairman; the indoctrinator and the cultural operations team of 120 men.
 - c. An assistant commanding officer for technical affairs who was in charge of the planning instructor, MIN Ch'ung-gi; the livestock instructor, KIM Sun-yol and the material control chief.
 - d. An assistant commanding officer for rear service who was over the provisions control chief, CHANG Chi-uk; the clothing control chief, KIM Pok-jin; the fuel control chief, CH'OE Il-ku; the finance control chief; a clerk, KIM U-tok; and the warehouse chief, HONG Chae-ok.
 - e. A medical station chief in charge of 100 men, a Social Security Office and a juvenile team of 40 men.

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7. The 1 Battalion of the 10 Detachment consisted of the following companies: 31, 33, 34, 37 and 59. Each company was composed of five platoons, including a women's platoon. The 2 Battalion included the 32, 35, 36, 38 and 39 Companies, with the companies organized in the same manner as those of the 1 Battalion.
8. The detachment had 1,364 chongbo² of rice paddy and 1,000 chongbo of dry fields. The land was plowed with tractors and chemical fertilizers were used. Farming tools have been made by the detachment and included 20 hulling machines, 10 rice polishing machines, 50 hand plows, 50 hoes, 300 shovels, 3,000 sickles and 2,000 short-handled hoes. The independent company had the following shops and plants: machine repair, paper, food processing, rice polishing and charcoal.
9. Members of the detachment engaged in physical labor received each day 1 kilogram of grain made up of 700 grams of rice and 300 grams of other cereals and clerical workers received 800 grams of grain per day. Vegetables, soy bean paste, fish and bean oil were also given but no meat was served. Members wore North Korean army uniforms, usually without insignia.

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